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With HMS Prince of Wales 
and HMS Warspite 
The Adventures of a Canadian Radar 
Officer in the Royal Navy 
Stuart E. Paddon 
ll ]hen the war was declared in 1939, I was in 
VV Noranda, Quebec, in a gold and copper 
mine. I came back from there in September to 
complete my final year in Physics at the 
University of Western Ontario. We had just 
started the University year when we were 
approached by the head of the Physics 
department to see if we were agreeable to having 
our syllabus altered to give emphasis to 
electronics. If you recall in those days electronics, 
certainly at Western, was a post-grad course, not 
an undergrad course. We agreed. 
This request had really originated with the 
Royal Navy, who had been unable to find any 
electronic talent at home because, I gather, all of 
it had been bought up by the RAF. The RN 
appealed to the Royal Canadian Navy, who in 
turn approached the National Research Council. 
Things proceeded as one might expect, until 
somewhere about February 1940. I then met the 
first naval officer I had ever seen, one Lieutenant-
Commander Finch-Noyes. He made it known to 
us that in a relatively short time we would be 
proceeding to serve with the Royal Navy in certain 
not very clear duties. There appeared to be a 
great deal of secrecy involved. In April we were 
asked to go to HMCS Prevost in London where 
we were attested, I believe my date was the 24th 
of April and I became an acting sublieutenant, 
temporary while holding on, gasping for breath, 
in the RCNVR. 
We crossed the Atlantic in a Castle Class 
Ship, the name I can't recall, but I do recall that 
the warship escorting us was the Revenge, an 
"R" Class battleship. We arrived in Portsmouth 
in early May 1946. 
As far as I know we were the first group of 
Canadians to hit the Portsmouth Royal Naval 
Barracks. Then radar was not called radar, it 
was called RDF. The term radar did not come 
into play until the Americans got involved. In 
any case we had a very short course to acquaint 
us with the principles of radar, which term I will 
use. 
By the end of June people then began to 
disperse to various ships. I was informed that I 
would be going to HMS Prince of Wales, but she 
was not to be commissioned until January 1941 
and there would be no requirement for me to 
stand by the ship much before November 1940. 
About mid-August I became one of several 
radar officers who acted as officer of a watch in 
the only naval radar station in the Battle of 
Britain chain, the remainder being manned by 
Air Force. 
The following month I asked to get some sea-
time because I had never served in any warship 
of any shape or size. The powers-that-be decided 
to send me to HMS Dido, a 5.25 cruiser, roughly 
6,000 tons, which was just completing 
construction at Camel Laird's Shipyards in the 
Mersey across from Liverpool. The Canadian 
who was the radar officer of this ship was my 
ex-Western friend Maurice Hartley; he received 
the first 281 radar that had been put together. 
Upon commissioning we sailed up to Scapa Flow 
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and commenced fairly elaborate evaluation trials 
of the radar. Four Royal Navy civilian scientists 
were aboard to determine what trials were 
conducted and to take results. 
At the end of this period Hartley wrote a 
scathing report of the type 281 radar, which his 
Captain should never have allowed to be 
dispatched from the ship, in the verbiage that 
was used; however, the fifteen or twenty 
recommendations that were the meat of the 
report were incorporated in later versions of the 
281 over the next couple of years. But the report 
was so scathing that the Commanding Officer of 
Signal School hauled Hartley down to 
been to sea before. I was the only technician; 
there were no technicians trained at that time in 
the Royal Navy for radar duties. Needless to say 
I found myself with my head inside a radar set 
almost continuously with maybe 40% of the sets 
not functioning at any one moment. Right from 
the outset I decided the type 281 would receive 
top priority, the gunnery sets would follow as 
best they could, with type 282s having the lowest 
priority. I didn't receive much direction because 
in those days nobody really knew much about 
radar and you found two things happen: one, 
you had to convince somebody it was worth 
carrying and when that was achieved, you had 
to convince them that it couldn't tell you what 
HMS Prince of Wales 
Portsmouth and raked him over the coals for 
the language used. I blame Dido's Captain for 
allowing it to go out of the ship without 
appropriate editing. 
I left Dido some time in early November for 
Camel Laird's shipyards, there taking up lodging 
at the little hotel at the ferry, across from 
Liverpool while standing by the Prince of Wales 
which was now nearing completion. 
The Prince of Wales was the first ship to get 
a multiple suit of radar. Up until this time ships 
carried one radar, now I was to get ten as follows: 
one type 281 radar, air warning principally, with 
a capability for surface detection as well; and 
nine gunnery radars, type 284 to control the 
main 14-inch armament, four 285s to control 
the HAlLA 5.25 directors, four 282s for mounting 
on the pompom directors. During the ensuing 
period I received 30 personnel, one of whom had 
kind of cigarettes a pilot was smoking when he 
was flying an aircraft. 
The ship commissioned about the 15th of 
January 1941. Two or three days before the ship 
was to commission we were attacked and so 
much damage was done to the harbour basin 
where the ship was anchored that we had 
difficulty getting her clear of the basin. We sailed 
to Scapa Flow carrying with us some fifty 
dockyard maties; I had one civilian scientist from 
HM Signal School as my specialist aboard ship. 
The ship, being what it was, was a showpiece 
and there were trials officers of ever description 
from all quarters and all branches inundating 
the wardroom at all times. One could not be sure 
who was a ship's officer and who was not a ship's 
officer. 
To illustrate this, one day at lunchtime I sat 
down beside a Commander (remember I was a 
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young sublieutenant) - and said to him, "Good 
morning, sir. Are you up for the trials?" He 
replied, "No. I'm your new Executive Officer. Who 
are you?" I answered, "My name's Paddon, sir. 
I'm the RDF officer." He said, "Well, I expect we'll 
get to know one another". This happened even 
quicker than he might have thought, because that 
night an engineer sublieutenant by the name of 
Tim Healey, who used to play rugger for the Navy, 
and I decided we would test out the new 
Executive Officer. In the anteroom, as distinct to 
the wardroom, we set up two chairs, one with 
its seat vertical and one in its normal position. I 
went to the far end of the wardroom and hurtled 
down the course, feet first over the first chair, 
caught the second one with my bottom in the 
seat causing it to end up in the upright position 
with me seated in it. This had the desired effect. 
Our Executive Officer stood up, walked over, took 
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Left: HMS Hood 
Above: Bismarck 
off his monkey jacket, arranged these two chairs 
in such a way that they were both in their normal 
position about four to six feet apart. He went to 
the end of the anteroom. He made a flip in the 
air off the first one and landed seated in the 
second one, picked up his jacket, walked out of 
the anteroom saying, "They used to call me 
"Tarzan." Needless to say the Executive Officer 
sold himself completely to us on his first testing. 
Unfortunately, he was later lost when the ship 
was sunk. But he was one of the finest naval 
officers I have ever had the pleasure of serving 
with because he did everything in just the right 
proportions. 
Our workups and test exercises were fairly 
extensive but we had had only one main 
armament shoot, when about May 22 Hood and 
ourselves had to proceed to sea to intercept the 
Bismarck, being shadowed with radar by Norfolk 
and Suffolk, two county class cruisers. Our 
Captain came on the PA system and told the 
ship's company that he anticipated intercepting 
the Bismarck at roughly six a.m. on the 24th of 
May, some thirty hours away. 
At exactly six a.m. on the 24th of May we 
encountered the Bismarck at 26,000 yards, 
roughly thirteen nautical miles, twenty degrees 
to starboard. The Flag Officer was in Hood and 
we proceeded in line-ahead with Hood leading. 
The Hood was a battlecruiser, without the 
armour plating which the Prince of Wales 
enjoyed. We were doing roughly thirty knots and 
opened fire at 26,000 yards. 
My position was in the 281 receiving office 
and I personally manned the display tube. In 
those days we had no gyro repeats; we had to 
give bearings by red or green, but we did have 
M-type transmission units, little counterdrums 
on which we could transmit range. The 
transmission counterdrum that I controlled had 
as its counterpart a receiver on the wall of the 
Transmitting Station, the TS. This had to be read 
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and placed by someone into the calculations 
which were being carried out on the plot. 
Unfortunately, despite the fact that I transmitted 
these ranges, no one even knew they were coming 
in on the counterdrum and no radar ranges were 
used by our gunnery people. We had had only 
one previous shoot, and had not developed any 
drill. This was unfortunate because I had three 
distinct echoes of three ships at 26,000 yards, 
clearly portrayed on the radar screen and A-scan 
with a linear blip. I was able to follow them in 
with complete accuracy and complete detail, 
religiously giving the range as I have described. 
The third ship turned out later, on investigation, 
to have been a supply vessel in company with 
the Bismarck and the Prince Eugen. I have never 
seen any reference to this supply vessel in 
anything I have subsequently read. 
There are many interesting features, some 
of which I can recount from personal experience, 
some only from accounts from fellow officers, 
as I was in an enclosed office did not see the 
Bismarck. A good friend of mine was a HA 
Director Control Officer and he watched the 
engagement from his station. Since he was not 
being used at this particular time for that range, 
he watched five salvoes of Bismarck's fall of shot; 
the first was roughly a hundred yards beyond 
the Hood, the second was a straddle of Hood, 
with the third he saw a fire occur on Hood, the 
fourth he did not detect and on the fifth Hood 
blew, just exploded. Bits of her fell on our deck. 
He watched the foretop, the whole mast 
structure, go hurtling through the air for a great 
distance. Only three survivors were picked up 
by escorting ships. 
Here the fallacy of our Admiral is indicated, 
as far as I am concerned. The range for Prince of 
Wales was almost identical with Hood, and 
Bismarck was able immediately to turn her fire 
on us, causing severe damage. Our whole 
compass platform was shot away and of the ten 
or so personnel normally stationed on the 
Compass Platform, seven were killed; the three 
most important people surviving, the Captain, 
the navigator and the Cox'n. A number of our 
Air Defence people were killed. 
An interesting story is that Esmond Knight, 
the actor, was an RNR lieutenant who was a 
shipmate and was an Air Defence Officer. He was 
seriously injured, losing one eye and badly 
damaging the second. Several days later we 
dropped him off at Iceland thinking he would 
not live. Many years later he appeared in many 
shows including "Henry the Eighth" and he was 
the actor who portrayed the Captain of the Prince 
of Wales in the movie "The Bismarck." 
The Prince of Wales continued to engage the 
Bismarck for twenty minutes before our Y turret 
seized by jamming of the loading trays so that 
the turret could not be trained. We did manage 
to fire a good number of rounds at Bismarck 
and we subsequently found through other 
accounts that damage was done to Bismarck, 
seriously disrupting her control of armament. 
That engagement in which Hood was sunk 
lasted twenty minutes and the plot shows that 
we broke action with Bismarck and that both 
ships proceeded on a parallel course at roughly 
fifteen miles separation. As stated we had 
suffered severe damage to our Compass 
Platform. In my own case, I lost five of my 
personnel in the after 285 radar office who were 
killed when an 8" shell exploded there. I well 
remember going to the plotting office which was 
directly below the compass platform and our 
Schoolmaster, the senior plot officer, was 
adamantly and religiously plotting the course of 
ourselves and accompanying ships with the 
blood dripping on the navigational chart from 
the compass platform above. That's a gory detail 
but it's true. In all we lost fifteen to twenty men 
killed and a number injured. 
From the radar point of view I think there 
were two points worth mentioning. While 
operating the 281 I was able to observe the blip 
of the sixteen inch shells that were being fired at 
us come towards us on the radar screen. Also, a 
certain amount of interference occurred. None 
of the ships in company had radars of the same 
frequency as the 281 on the Prince of Wales, yet 
I was able to lock onto radar transmissions of 
some kind which I reported to Admiralty. Their 
scientists visited the ship later to discuss what I 
had seen. Subsequently, the decision was that 
Bismarck had some form of radar of comparable 
frequency to our 281, which was operating at 
86 megacycles. 
The damage done to the radar systems was 
extensive. As my 281 receiver mast had been 
shot away, I was denied the use of 281 as a 
93 
4
Canadian Military History, Vol. 6 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 11
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss2/11
surface set or as an air warning set. The after 
285 office containing two sets had been seriously 
damaged, killing five persons. I was left with a 
284 with its antenna mounted on the director 
control tower; two 285s mounted on HA/LA 
directors, one port, one starboard; and four 282s 
which were relatively useless. This becomes 
important later when we consider what 
happened during the night. 
The main problem Prince of Wales had 
encountered was that Y turret loading trays had 
jammed, preventing it from being trained. Work 
commenced on that; we were fortunate in having 
some of the dockyard maties on board. By 
roughly four o'clock in the afternoon we were 
ready to re-engage the Bismarck. We did so for 
a number of rounds, but before I go into that I 
would like to mention one other happening. 
The weather had been worsening very 
seriously, with poor visibility occurring most of 
the afternoon. We were steaming on a parallel 
course, roughly fifteen miles from Bismarck, 
when suddenly steaming in the opposite 
direction another ship was detected. And all 
wheels, all gears, started to turn around to 
engage this new target, going 180 degrees in the 
opposite direction to the two of us. Just as we 
were about to engage and open fire the Gunnery 
Officer in the DCT said, "Cease fire. That is the 
US Coast Guard vessel, such and such". It 
happened that he had been reading the messages 
some time during the day, had seen this ship 
was in the vicinity and it had steamed right up 
between the Bismarck and ourselves, going in 
the opposite direction. They probably didn't even 
know that they passed between these two ships. 
As the day progressed, at about four o'clock, 
we did engage Bismarck at roughly thirty 
thousand yards. Our maximum range on our 
fourteen inch guns was fifteen to twenty miles, 
firing two thousand pound (roughly a ton) 
projectiles. We had three turrets, with four guns 
in A turret, two in B and four in Y. Thus we had 
ten 14 inch guns capable of a broadside of ten 
tons of metal, every thirty seconds. 
When we engaged Bismarck at four o'clock, 
she replied, but not at us. She seemed to aim at 
either Norfolk or Suffolk, one of the escorting 
cruisers, I forget which. And her fall of shot was 
well off target. This led us to believe that she 
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had trouble with her fire control. We were 
proceeding with this engagement when we were 
suddenly directed to disengage in order that a 
flight of torpedo bombers from the aircraft 
carrier Victorious (I'm not sure where she was) 
might attack. We disengaged and watched some 
twelve, fifteen, eighteen Swordfish carry out a 
torpedo attack on the Bismarck with fatal results 
to them, not to Bismarck. I don't believe any 
damage occurred to her from the results of that 
attack. 
As the afternoon went on the weather got 
worse. I kept a watch on the type 284 and the 
gunnery people manned the director control 
tower and we were tracking Bismarck with the 
DCT, which is almost impossible from a 
mechanical point of view, because of the very 
great weight of the antenna and the director 
combined. In the long run we lost Bismarck 
during the night. 
We were forced to return via Iceland after, 
we buried our dead at sea, a very impressive 
ceremony, and delivered our wounded to 
Rejkavik or was it Valfjord, including Esmond 
Knight whom I mentioned earlier. The only other 
feature that comes to my mind is that as we 
proceeded then to Rosythe for damage repairs, 
we were still able to steam at thirty knots, 
although we had suffered some damage by an 
underwater hit of a sixteen inch projectile, which 
had caused us to take in a large volume of water, 
the tonnage of which I can now not remember. 
During our subsequent refit at Rosythe an 
unexploded sixteen inch projectile was found in 
one of our underwater spaces and we cleared 
the drydock while this suspicious looking animal 
was removed from the ship. 
As an aftermath to the Bismarck show: I had 
mentioned earlier that we had a scientist from 
HM Signal School. He and I cleaned out the after 
285 office and by that I mean we extracted 
portions of people from the equipment. With the 
transmitter of one type 285 and appropriate 
connections to the antenna and with the receiver 
of another 285, we got one system functioning 
in the HAlLA 5.25" Control System. It was not a 
pleasant task. We had five people distributed 
through there. Not a happy memory. 
One happier memory is that I was granted 
some leave while we were in Rosythe and I took 
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HMS Prince of Wales leaving Placentia, NFLD, after the Churchill-Roosevelt meeting, August 1941. 
£52, the pound then being worth $4.4 7 and went 
to London for two weeks' leave; at the end of 
one week I had one pound left. I came back to 
my ship, went down to my cabin and in my bunk 
was a body; they were not expecting me. I shook 
this body and said, "What the hell are you doing 
in my bunk?" A Canadian voice said, "Well Christ! 
Who the hell are you?" And I said, ''I'm the guy 
who owns this bunk." The body was a Canadian, 
Ralph Ripley, who had joined the ship from King 
Alfred, while I was away. He became a close and 
fast friend but unfortunately he was lost, not 
when we were sunk off Malaya, but when 
Singapore fell. A fine, fine friend, and he was in 
my bunk when I got back from leave in 1941. 
During the time we underwent damage 
repairs, I got a type 273 radar, a warning set of 
ten centimetres wavelength. The antennas were 
well up the foremast and the equipment was 
directly under them in a housing about the office. 
It was maybe ninety to a hundred feet about 
water level. 
The next event worth mentioning was that 
we were very surprised to receive Mr. Winston 
Churchill, whom we transported to Placentia 
Harbour in Newfoundland, where he met 
Roosevelt for what is now called the Atlantic 
Charter meeting. We were a private ship, no flag 
officer carried; however we had a tremendous 
amount of brass present on this occasion: all 
the Chiefs of Staff and a myriad of staff officers 
who were in Churchill's entourage. 
On the approaches to the Canadian area, or 
at the time the Newfoundland area, we were met 
by three Canadian destroyers. This was my first 
opportunity to see the Canadian Navy at work. 
They escorted us into Placentia Harbour. 
I have a host of memories of this occasion. 
One of these was going over to HMCS 
Restigouche to buy some Canadian cigarettes, 
which I had been without for too long a period. I 
knew none of the Canadian officers, but I was 
well received in the Wardroom and asked to join 
in a crap game in progress on the deck. The 
person at my left turned out to be Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt Jr., then a young ensign in the 
US Navy. He had been invited to this occasion, 
along with his brother who was in the Army, in 
order to meet Churchill. I purchased ten 
thousand Buckingham cigarettes and this 
occupied two huge cartons. I was intending to 
call my ship to send a boat when FOR Jr. 
suggested that he take me back in the boat 
allocated to him. I was duly delivered to my ship 
along with my ten thousand cigarettes. 
On another occasion, all the officers of the 
Prince Q[Wales were introduced to Mr. Roosevelt. 
He took a particular interest in me because I 
was at that time one of only two Canadian officers 
in the wardroom, the other being Ralph Ripley. 
As a matter of interest, a midshipman, Dick Leir, 
was also aboard the ship at that time; he had 
joined during the repair period as well. 
Each evening during the crossing both going 
over to Newfoundland on the way back to the 
UK, Churchill would come directly into the 
wardroom after deck, over the upper deck to 
the bridge structure. At one point, the Sub placed 
his hand on Churchill's elbow as if to help him 
along, and was told in no uncertain terms, to 
keep his hands off him. Mr. Churchill was 
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perfectly capable of looking after himself. He'd 
been to sea before this boy was born and would 
he please just lead him up to the bridge. 
We finally left Newfoundland and proceeded 
back on our own as we could do thirty knots. I 
remember very well, at one point, we passed 
through a huge convoy of ships, which I would 
guess was doing about eight or ten knots, and at 
this time Churchill made his famous V sign to 
many of the merchant ships as we passed them. 
I have seen pictures of him so doing on many 
occasions in later years. He finally left us with 
his group at Iceland, at Rejkavik. We then 
returned to Scapa Flow. I presume he took 
passage in some other smaller ship back to 
England from Iceland. 
The Admiralty decided to send Prince of 
Wales on a Malta convoy into the Mediterranean 
to test it against aircraft attack. We proceeded 
to Gibraltar where I bought seven pairs of silk 
pyjamas. And among other things, more 
importantly I believe, we took the first ten 
centimetre radar into the Mediterranean. This 
becomes important later as we had occasion to 
detect the presence of a submarine in the early 
hours of the morning at two or three o'clock on 
two consecutive nights. We had the Ark Royal, 
Nelson, Prince of Wales, six or eight cruisers, 
about twenty destroyers, and we were escorting 
fifteen to eighteen merchant ships. On the 
occasion I make mention of now, one of my 
leading seamen was the 273 operator at two in 
the morning. I was safely asleep in my bunk when 
he detected (at some fourteen thousand yards) 
what he classified as a possible submarine. This 
echo was tracked continuously, a very nice plot, 
until it entered the ground wave and clutter of 
the ships in company. There were suddenly three 
explosions. By this time, of course, I had been 
routed out of my bunk and I was up in the 
plotting office. The Admiral whom we were 
carrying was the admiral in charge of the cruiser 
squadron, but he was riding with us. He sent a 
message off to all twenty or twenty-five 
destroyers: "Report the result of your depth 
charge attack." By morning all destroyers 
reported they had carried out no such attack. 
All depth charges were intact - none had been 
dropped. The staff then decided that this had 
been a submarine and that it had fired three 
torpedoes. I was told, though I had no personal 
knowledge, that the, Italian torpedo ofthat day, 
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surfaced at the end of its run and exploded. The 
staff concluded that the three detonations which 
had been heard were three of these torpedoes. 
The following night at roughly the same time, 
the same operator was again on duty. He again 
detected the presence of what he classified as a 
possible submarine. A plot commenced, however 
the Admiral immediately caused the Fleet to take 
evasive action, with all ships going in all 
directions at great rates. I remember this very 
well, because I still argue with Terry Burchell, 
whether he or I had the first mention in 
dispatches for any of our personnel. The seaman 
who had been my operator on the two occasions 
was mentioned in a dispatch that this Admiral 
made to Admiralty which read something like, 
"It has been conclusively proven that this new 
device called RDF can be used effectively against 
a submarine if that submarine is surfaced." This 
message recounted the events of the two nights 
and made mention of this operator who had been 
at the set at the time. Burchell and I have never 
resolved our argument about who was first to 
get one of his staff mentioned-in-dispatches. 
The Admiralty's wishes were granted. We 
were subjected to a series of air attacks, none of 
which were massive by any means. Ark Royal's 
aircraft were in company. On one occasion when 
it was fairly hectic, we had engaged an 
approaching enemy aircraft and succeeded in 
knocking it down. We rapidly changed target to 
another aircraft in close pursuit and 
unfortunately we shot down one of Ark Royal's 
fighters. If I remember correctly the pilot of the 
Ark Royal fighter was rescued, picked up by an 
escorting destroyer, but it does show the mix-up 
that occurs when you're busy in the middle of 
an attack. The only other event of importance 
was when Nelson received a torpedo in the bow. 
She suffered no real apparent damage, other than 
that she had been holed. I believe it was a 
submarine torpedo, but on this point I'm not 
certain. As far as I am aware, we were able to 
deliver the convoy of merchant ships intact to 
Malta. We then returned to Scapa Flow. 
Again I'm uncertain of my timetable, but I 
believe it would be sometime in October 1941 
when we were told we would be leaving for 
somewhere. Our first port of call after Scapa Flow 
was in the Clyde where Admiral Toni Phillips 
and his staff of some 20 or 30 officers joined the 
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ship. This was the first time we had become a 
flagship as such, except for carrying an Admiral 
on our Mediterranean Malta cruise. We sailed 
immediately. What impressed me was, within the 
hour I was called to the Admiral's sea cabin, 
introduced to the Admiral who told me that he 
wished to visit every radar office in the ship, sit 
in the operator's chair and have explained to him 
what the operator had to do in each set aboard. 
This I did. I have read many criticisms of this 
Admiral over ensuing years, but as a first 
impression it was very encouraging to me that 
he took such an interest that, within an hour of 
joining the ship, he took the time to visit every 
radar office. 
It was not until we were some days out of 
the Clyde on our way to the East that we got any 
impression of where we were going. Our first port 
of call was at Freetown, which was my first 
opportunity to see an African port. I must admit 
it was a real eye opener to see how some of our 
African friends lived. Then we stopped in for a 
very pleasant two or three days' stay in Cape 
Town, where again the lights were on and the 
food was magnificent. We proceeded from Cape 
Town to a small island which was a strategic 
place for refuelling by the British navy. 
We had a pleasant stopover in Colombo in 
Ceylon. At the time I did not realize our stay was 
abbreviated, presumably by some intelligence I 
was not made aware of, and that we left one day 
earlier than planned. I recall this because I had 
purchased a very, very nice gown for the girl who 
later became my wife, but I was unable to pick it 
up due to unexpected sailing. However, later I 
picked this gown up and interestingly enough it 
was being held for me, under the counter in the 
store with my name on it. Although the price 
had doubled, because at that time there were 
many Americans in the area, I still paid what 
was agreed upon originally. 
We left Ceylon, proceeded to Singapore and 
the impressive harbour, although Prince Q[Wales 
went to the Dockyard which is a different location 
on the island. We were there five or six days 
before things began to happen. 
This was an upsetting period in a way, 
because we found the population there almost 
completely unaware that a war was going on. We 
visited the Singapore Swimming Club (where I 
ran up a small bill, which I don't remember 
paying) and the Raffles Hotel. There seemed to 
be a complete lack of feeling towards the war. 
This was rudely interrupted on quote "December 
7th"; I say quote because I do not know how the 
International Date Line comes into play. What I 
do know is that on the same Sunday that Pearl 
Harbour was attacked, Singapore was also 
attacked. It was at night and we fired at the 
intruding aircraft, without any success, I might 
add. The attack was not a severe one, but it did 
wake up the local residents a bit. 
We sailed the following day and our mission, 
it was later revealed, was to sweep into the Gulf 
of Siam, to lay waste a large flotilla of transports 
which were reported to be in that area. We had 
Repulse in company and three escorting 
destroyers. Monday and most of Tuesday passed 
without any significant event. On the Tuesday 
evening just before dark, we detected the 
presence of a snooping aircraft which would 
come up over the horizon and take a look and 
go back down. This was reported, of course, to 
the Admiral. This would be as I recall, sevenish 
to eightish at night. I believe it would have been 
about ten o'clock at night that word was passed 
that the Admiral, realizing the presence of a ship, 
decided to abandon the mission and return to 
Singapore. 
We remained at what I would call secondary 
degree of readiness, not action stations, but 
sufficiently so that I stayed close to my action 
station. Some time in the night I was called to 
my action station in the office of the 284 radar 
which controlled the main armament. I had no 
sooner closed up there when it was reported that 
a scow or some form of small vessel had been 
detected. I assume it had been detected by our 
273 radar, but I do not know that for certain. I 
have since read in the book called The Battleship 
that a squadron of Japanese ships passed us 
during the night, at a range of eight or nine miles. 
All I can say is I do not believe the navigator 
would not have had the 273 radar on. If it was 
not functioning I would have heard about it very 
quickly. If those ships had been within seven or 
eight miles we would have detected them. There 
is no question in my mind that they would not 
have been detected. I did not know of the 
presence of that squadron until about six months 
ago, when Admiral Pickford recommended that 
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I read the book, The Battleship so this still 
remains a mystery in my mind. During the night 
the 281 air waming radar had been shut down 
by a policy of radar silence. 
So Many conflicting things come to my 
attention: the same book, The Battleship 
mentions that breakfast was served on the Prince 
of Wales. I remember vividly that there was no 
breakfast served in the wardroom, because 
Ralph Ripley and I broke into the wardroom 
locker and took out some fruit which resembles 
a grapefruit but bigger, about twice the size of a 
grapefruit. We went out and stretched out on the 
quarterdeck and we were peeling this very large 
piece of fruit when I saw an aircraft, high in the 
sky above us. This would have been about eight-
thirty to nine o'clock in the morning of the 
Wednesday. Ralph Ripley being the second air 
defence officer went to an adjacent phone and 
called the bridge to see if they had seen the 
aircraft. They reported that it was friendly. 
About ten or thereabouts we were suddenly 
called to air warning stations, I put the air 
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at Portsmouth, ca. 1936. 
waming radar on and almost immediately we 
were under attack by Japanese aircraft. I should 
mention that we had received some report that 
there had been a landing of Japanese ships, 
transports presumably, at some 
unpronounceable name up the Malayan Coast 
and the Admiral had decided to investigate it. 
He flew off the two Walrus, one from the Prince 
of Wales and the other from Repulse and sent a 
destroyer in to check out this reported landing. 
The two Walrus never did return to the ships 
but flew back to Singapore. No sign of Japanese 
landings was found at the point of inspection. 
In the meantime, we were lying offshore, 20 
to 25 miles, waiting for the destroyer to join us, 
when we suddenly found ourselves under attack. 
When I did put the air waming set on, we found 
aircraft approaching from something less than 
twenty miles. When they broke clear of the land 
echoes, there showed in relatively small numbers 
in groups of nine or ten per group. 
My air defence station was on the after part 
of the bridge, aft of the air defence control 
position, where I watched several attacks of 
aircraft come in on us. They concentrated on 
Prince Q[Wales initially, without paying too much 
attention to Repulse as I remember it. I watched 
three torpedoes hit Prince of Wales on the 
starboard side, without any apparent effect. 
Suddenly there was a very heavy shock in the 
ship, as if she had been picked up fifty feet and 
then dropped. When we stopped bouncing 
around we had a list to port of roughly fifteen 
degrees. I now understand that this was one or 
possibly two hits on our port shaft and as we 
were doing a good speed, the high revolution rate 
of the shaft, on being hit by a torpedo, caused a 
great deal of destruction in the shaft tunnels. 
Most of the engine room and so on, on the port 
side was inundated with water and we lost power 
throughout most of the ship. This would now be 
approximately eleven-thirty. 
With the list we had, we were unable to bring 
our starboard armament to bear on the low flying 
torpedo aircraft that were coming in from the 
starboard side so we were powerless to do much 
of anything. 
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At some point during this period when we 
were unable to combat the enemy, I was detailed 
along with Ralph Ripley, the other Canadian, the 
assistant air defence officer, to accompany the 
Captain, John Leech, on a tour of the ship, aft. 
We arrived at the cinema flat, the largest open 
area in the ship, directly above the armoured 
deck and over the engine room spaces. A large 
number of people had been badly wounded by a 
bomb which had detonated on this deck where 
all the engine room personnel and so on had 
congregated after the torpedo had hit at an earlier 
point. Then the Captain returned to the upper 
deck, to the base of the bridge structure. He 
turned to Ripley and me and said, "Gather some 
men together and prepare some Carley floats in 
case of abandon ship". 
Our Carley floats were attached to the bridge 
structure at various points, and our task was to 
get them free and ready for use. The Captain 
went back to his post on the Compass Platform. 
Earlier, before the Captain and Ripley and I 
toured the ship, I had watched the Repulse sink. 
At the beginning of the engagement the Japanese 
had paid the greatest attention to Prince qfWales. 
When they found that they had pretty well put 
us out of action, they then turned a very 
concentrated effort on Repulse. At the time I was 
standing near the signal deck of the after part of 
the bridge structure and watched about eight or 
nine torpedo bombers approach Repulse from 
the stern. Repulse was still doing a good speed 
and I later heard that Captain Tennant managed 
to avoid seventeen or eighteen torpedoes, before 
the ship was hit. However, while I watched, the 
ship, in an attempt to avoid an attack which was 
then being carried out on her, made a turn to 
starboard from which she never recovered. As 
she went into the starboard turn she continued 
to move forward, went over on her starboard 
side and when I saw her last, her props were 
still turning, actually turning as she disappeared. 
Her sinking was in great contrast to ours. 
Repulse went down so quickly that her loss of 
life was very great, much higher than we 
sustained. She sank at twelve-thirty, Prince oj 
Wales sat for about an hour or so later and sank 
at one-twenty. During this interval we remained 
at this heavy list to port. 
Mter making the tour with the Captain and 
while the ship remained at this very difficult list, 
I was carrying out the procedure of freeing Carley 
floats. Then the ship suddenly heaved up very 
rapidly and it was clear to everyone that this 
was it. She went down, rolling very rapidly to 
port. 
I was on the starboard side of the big bridge 
structure, with the ship going very rapidly to port. 
The only thing I could do was scramble. I tried 
three times to climb the deck towards the 
starboard side and get off that side. On each 
occasion I slid back on the deck into the Bridge 
structure. I finally realized I couldn't get off the 
starboard side. Although my mind is confused, 
I remember sliding down what was probably one 
of the stays for the foremast. By the way, while I 
was scrambling I was probably the last to see 
both John Leech, our Captain, and the Admiral, 
"Tom Thumb" Phillips, because I saw the two of 
them attempting to get out of the hatch, in the 
deckhead of the Compass Platform. The two of 
them were climbing or trying to climb through 
that hatch, whilst I was trying to make my way 
over to the port side of the ship. 
I was one of very few who managed to escape 
the ship by going over the port side, or what had 
been the port side, probably more likely part of 
the mast structure. In any case, at some point I 
saw clear water below and I dove. I was wearing 
a Mae West. For a moment I seemed to be 
entangled briefly by something around my foot, 
which I managed to kick free. I popped up and 
swam very rapidly. Finally I came across an 
emergency biscuit package ration from one of 
the ship's boats. I put my arm over this and 
looked around, there was no ship. It was gone. I 
was lucky not to have been sucked down by the 
ship itself. 
Later on I managed to get to a catamaran, 
which had broken free from the ship. There were 
three or four others, one of whom was 
Commander Brown, the Staff Gunnery Officer 
on the Admiral's Staff. A number of us clambered 
up on this catamaran and sat there and watched 
the Japanese aircraft that were still above, 
watching destroyers moving, picking up 
survivors. 
Some thing I should have mentioned earlier 
was that, the destroyer HMS Express was able 
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to come alongside the after portion of the 
quarterdeck of Prince of Wales before she sank 
and many of the battleship's crew were able to 
move from her quarterdeck directly onto the 
focs'l of Express. Now this destroyer was so 
close, that when Prince of Wales actually turned 
over and went rapidly down, the stem or bow of 
Express caught momentarily on the sinking ship 
as she turned. Fortunately the CO was able to 
back off and free this destroyer and get clear. 
But something like five or six hundred of Prince 
of Wales personnel managed to transfer directly 
from deck to deck. 
In my case, I remained in the water, I 
suppose, an hour and a half. During this period 
the Japanese aircraft did not make any attempt 
to bother the two destroyers picking up 
survivors, the third destroyer having left us some 
time that morning. 
I saw my only friendly aircraft, a Brewster 
Buffalo, fly over while I was sitting in the water 
and I'm not sure that we waved hilariously at 
him at this point. I saw some reference in the 
book Battleship about raucous comments but I 
don't think any of that happened. I was not 
picked up by the Express, I was picked up by 
the Electra which, in the main, picked up 
survivors from the Repulse. Something like 800 
personnel were aboard the Electra, and after she 
had picked up all the survivors that could be 
found, we proceeded back to Singapore where 
we were greeted by the shore staff. 
In Singapore there was suddenly available 
to the authorities additional personnel from our 
survivors. Many of the officers were given special 
jobs; my friend Ripley was put in charge of a 
small boat, probably a patrol vessel of some kind 
in which he spent the next two or three weeks or 
longer going up the Malayan Coast and 
infiltrating personnel and ammunition behind 
Japanese lines. He and other officers from Prince 
qfWales and Repulse were engaged in this work. 
One day I was in the Headquarters building 
and stood smartly aside to allow the Admiral to 
go by, when he looked at me and said, "Come 
into my office." I followed and he said, "I've got 
just the job for a young fellow like you," and then, 
almost immediately, "What is that green stripe 
for?'' I said, "I was the radar officer of the Prince 
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of Wales, Sir." He said, "Oh, you will not be able 
to do this job then." And I was dismissed. 
Soonafter I was transfered to Colombo, 
Ceylon where my job as Port Radar Officer at 
was very easy. I had a Petty Officer Technician, 
the frrst of his kind that I had ever seen. Although 
he had come from some ship, he had not been 
with us in the Singapore episode. Whenever a 
ship that had any radar came into port, the PO 
and I would go aboard to check whether they 
had any problems that required assistance. He 
would take the type 286, which was the set the 
destroyers were then carrying, and check it out. 
Some of the destroyers had a 285 by this time, 
and I'd check that out as I had had a lot of 
experience on that type of equipment. After 
roughly an hour's time, I would adjourn to the 
Wardroom, have a noggin with the ship's officers, 
and if there were no other ships coming in that 
day I would proceed to the golf course where I 
was an honourary and, I hope, also an 
honourable member. It cost me nothing and I 
enjoyed that Royal Colombo Golf course very 
much. 
Among the things that happened when I was 
in Colombo, was that the Royal Sovereign was 
there and for the first time I met Bob Battles, its 
radar officer and a Canadian. Bob was having 
difficulty with his 284 Surface Gunnery Radar. 
Between us we refitted the whole antenna, a great 
big trough, with dozens of dipole elements in it. 
My stay in Ceylon was rudely interrupted one 
Sunday morning as I was having a late breakfast. 
The Fleet Signal Officer came in and said, 
"Paddon, get your gear together," of which I had 
none by the way, "and you will join Warspite this 
afternoon at two o'clock." Warspite, after having 
been severely damaged at Crete, had proceeded 
to Bremerton Shipyard in the Pacific, in 
Washington State and was refitted. Among other 
things, she was supposed to have received some 
new radar, including two 285s, a 282, a 284, 
and a 273. The five sets as I recall. 
At two o'clock that Sunday afternoon, I joined 
Warspite, 20 seconds after Admiral Sommerville 
joined. Sommerville was, if you recall, 
Commander Force "H," operating out of Gibraltar 
earlier in the war. There are many stories of him 
and Admiral Cunningham in their exchange of 
messages with biblical quotations. He was now 
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Flag Officer, Pacific Fleet, and Warspite his 
flagship. We had no sooner joined, he twenty 
seconds ahead of me, than I, being something I 
had never been before, Staff Officer on the 
Admiral's Staff, decided that I should go to the 
Admiral's bridge. As I'd never even been on the 
ship before, I wasn't even sure where that was. 
Anyway I got up on the after part of the Bridge, 
as soon as I was aboard. We sailed and I suddenly 
saw a long face with a brass hat turn around 
and look at me and say, "You, come here." So 
over I went. "Yes, Sir." "Who are you?" "Well I'm 
your radar officer, Sir." "What's your name?" 
"Paddon, Sir." Then as we were leaving harbour, 
he looked at Illustrious, or it might have been 
Formidable, and said, "What kind of 
interrogation equipment has Illustrious?" But he 
called the ship by its incorrect name, the ship 
he named was at Trincomalee. Now the answer 
was significant. The 281 s required an 
interrogator, which was a 242. The 279s which 
Illustrious carried did not require an 
interrogator; it did its own interrogation by its 
propagation frequency. What do you tell an 
admiral: that he is calling a ship by its wrong 
name? Or do you try to explain the complexities 
of radar to him? At this point I don't remember 
what the hell I did but he appreciated me from 
then on because very shortly afterwards he found 
that I was the only one who knew the difference 
between Ramilles, Royal Sovereign, Revenge 
and the fourth "R," Resolution, because of some 
little differences in their radar suites. As I was 
the only one who could pick it out time after 
time, I would be called up by the Bridge and the 
Admiral would say, "Paddon which one of the 
"R" class battleships is that one over there?" I 
would look across at the suite of radar and say, 
"That's the Ramilles, Sir." I was at least useful 
on some occasions. 
The Fleet at this time consisted of the Flag 
Ship Warspite and the four "R" class battleships, 
three aircraft carriers Illustrious, Formidable 
and one other, with something like 20 percent 
complement of aircraft. A number of cruisers 
and a variety of destroyers, some 30 ships 
probably in all. 
We were at sea for a week maybe, when the 
attack on Ceylon occurred. We got some warning 
of this but I'm not sure how. The Admiral sent 
off a search flight from one of the carriers, which 
was able to report back that the strength of the 
enemy was formidable. I must admit that this 
being my first time at sea after having just been 
sunk, I was very pleased when discretion became 
the better part of valour, and the Admiral decided 
to take his whole Fleet up to Bombay where we 
spent eight delightful days. 
Before this happened Cornwall and 
Dorsetshire, who had been in Colombo with us, 
were ordered to join the Fleet, and it was during 
their approach to join us, that they were sunk 
by Japanese aircraft. As a matter of fact, on the 
281 in Warspite, we watched the aerial activity 
over the ships, during the time of their sinking. 
An interesting by-product. Again the radar 
officer of the Cornwall was a Canadian, who's 
name escapes me. I met him back in Colombo 
weeks later, and he said that the two ships were 
sunk in less than ten minutes by the Japanese 
aircraft. He also mentioned that when they had 
sunk the two ships, the formations of Japanese 
aircraft formed up and dipped and saluted the 
survivors in the water. They did not fire at them 
which was the same as my own experience with 
the Prince of Wales when we were sunk. This 
type of story is in such contrast to the horror 
stories one heard of the Japanese Army that I 
think it is worth mentioning. Maybe there was a 
different ethic in the Japanese Navy. 
Of many events in the happening in the 
Indian Ocean, one that comes to mind, is when 
the decision was made to take over Madagascar 
from the Vichy French. This was an unbelievable 
sight, a vast armada of merchant craft with 
Commandos. All the strength of the Far East 
Fleet, including the aircraft carriers and Warspite 
and all the "R" class battleships assembled one 
morning one mile off a little village called 
Tamatave, which is about half-way down the 
coast of Madagascar. Other ships had moved into 
the beautiful harbour of Diego Suarez and had 
landed and taken possession of the harbour, 
which is one of the most beautiful harbours in 
the world. On this morning of the so-called Battle 
ofTamatave, we sailed up and down about one 
mile off the shore. Apparently we had all the 
information on gun emplacements and where 
they were located and each of the ships had been 
given appropriate targets. The Admiral was very 
much inclined not to bombard. He sent an envoy 
ashore to say, "If you do not surrender within 
twenty minutes, I will be forced to open fire." 
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HMS Warspite, November 1942. 
Twenty minutes after the envoy had returned the 
French had not surrendered. The Admiral sent 
the envoy ashore again and said, "If you do not 
surrender within twenty minutes, I will open fire 
this time." The time, of course, passed by and 
still the French did not surrender. Just at that 
moment when the morning watch was turning 
over to the forenoon watch and gunlayer A was 
not in his seat, the French fired one shot. Of 
course, none of Warspite's guncrew were in a 
position to fire at this moment, but as soon as 
the French had fired the one shot, a myriad of 
white flags went up ashore and they surrendered. 
That was the battle ofTamatave. One shot was 
fired by them and that was all. 
Captain S.E. Paddon, May 1961. 
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The other most significant event that 
occurred in this period in the Indian Ocean is 
that I was promoted to the very senior rank of 
Lieutenant, I think it was the 24th of April1942. 
Somewhere around November 1942 or 
thereabouts I was informed that I would be 
relieved and returned to Canada before long. 
That was a very vague timing. As a matter of 
fact, I finally left the ship in early January of 
1943 at Durban in South Mrica. 
Rear-Admiral Stuart Edmund Paddon was 
born in October 1917 in St. Thomas, 
Ontario. Following the events described in 
this article, Paddon served in the signals 
directorate at Naval Service Headquarters in 
Ottawa and was demobilized in 1945. 
Paddon joined the regular navy as a 
lieutenant in June 1946. Apart from two 
years as electrical officer aboard HMCS 
Ontario, Paddon spent the balance of his 
career as a staff officer at shore bases, 
retiring at the rank of rear-admiral in July 
1972. He passed away in November 1989 at 
the age of 72. 
This article has been adapted from the original 
version printed in Salty Dips, Volume 1, 1983. 
It has been reproduced with the permission of 
the Naval Officers' Association of Canada, Ottawa 
Branch. 
Special thanks to Ken Macpherson for providing 
the ship photos. 
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